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NC\\ z~a]and will no doubt \.:Clehrate the c~ntcnnial of the Industrial Conciliation and . 
Arhiration Act in the ncar future. either on 31 August 1994 ( 100 )C~tr~ ,,r~r pas~agc) or on I 
January 1995 ( 100 years "ftcr effect). As that centennial i.lpproachcs. the Green Pap~'r offers~~ 
tin1cl) and useful opportunity to identif~ and rt:\'iew the h~bic ~l"sumption~ and opcrllting 
axiom~ of that ~)sten1. This comment will set out those assumption~ ;.tnd attempt to articulate 
the corollaries which tlow from thetn. 
The n1ost hasic axion1. and the lowest con1mon denotninator of all \\e~tern industrial 
rdations sy~ten1s. is the principle of collecti\'c bargaining. Indeed. the histOt) of industrial 
rcJations of the "0th centut') is littk n1orc than an annotation or 19th centUI) judici<tl hostilit) 
to. and ultimate legislative endorsetnent or. the practice of collective bargaining. 
That principle. conJctnned unlilthe 20th century as a critninal con!)piracy. is the right of 
\\Orkers hy ht\\ to eslabli~h or to select an artificial legal person to sene as a bargaining agent 
''ith the employer/employers of those workers in contract negotiations. conciliation. 
arbitration. and dispute resolution gener~llly (hereafter. .. collective bargaining agent .. \\ill be 
ahbre\ it~ ted <ts CBA. or ""the union··}. The institutional ~ignificance. not to say threatening 
aspect. of collective harg~tining is dramatically apparent hy rcferen~·L' to certain lines of 
;.tuthority when: the intL·r~·L·ssion of such an agency is unthinkable (at present): prison 
superintendant - prisunt>r. in the designation of accomrnod<ttion block: battalion con1-
mander- prt\'ate soldier. in detern1ination or tnilitary a ~ signrncnt: profes or- university 
student. in allocation ofexanltnark. The significanceofcolleclive bargltining in the industrial 
arena i that the ernplo)Cr 1nu~t accept the designated represt>ntative of the \\Orkers at the 
bargaining tahk. hoth to establish nt:\\ agreen1ent . and to interpret or to fulfill existing 
agreetnenb. It would be unfair and illegal to attempt to h) pass that representati\e and deal 
\\ith or in1pose upon the \\orkers dire\.:tly as indi' iduals. 
Se,ercd corallary 4uestions ne\.:essarily folio\\ upon recognition of the collccti\e bargain-
ing principle: 
L How do the \\Orkers select. create. or reco1!nise their CBA'! And \\ill their CBA he 
._ 
associatt>d with workers crafl-\\ise (horizontally) or industry-\\ise (\ertic<tll) )'! 
2. \Vhich ctnployers. or rather\\ hich aspects of an employer's cntcrpri~c. is .. covered" hy a 
particular CBA? If ~·n crnploycr produces. packages. warehouses. sells. and delivers a 
product. (tJHI keeps all manner of clerical r~cords. docs the ~ame CBA cover those 
workplaces'? 
3. Once the first., 4ues1ions have been <tnswered. and the 2 parties to collective bargaining 
ha\e been identified. a third 4uestion ari~es: Are there any lirnih on the p<trties· b<trgaining 
capacity'! b th~rc a managerial prerogati\'c dosed to the CBA? Docs the en1ployer wish to 
bargain about oiT-the-joh responsibilities of or benefits to workers? 
4. A fou11h problem should <llso he identified: If the CBA has rights and n.:sponsihilitie~ on 
the bargaining platforn1. does it have standing to participale (to sue anc.lto he su~d) in the 
performance of an) bargain~ struck? In other words. ifthe emplo)erdoes not perfonn (pay 
\\age~ ~ts agr~·ed) docs the collccti\c bargaining agent ha\e the standing to pursue a 
rcrncdy'! Cornersely. if the \\Orkers collectively do not perfonn docs the collecti\e 
hargaining agent ha\e a liability or'' re~ponsihilit) to ensure pcrfonnance (or to pi.t)' 
d a 111 ages for non- pc rfo nn <tn cc )'.) 
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In New Zealand. the collective bargaining achieven1ents of Willian1 Pen1ber Reeve::; in 
1894. a~ further strengthened by the first Labour Governn1ent in 1936. were in1posed on the 
actors in the industrial relations dran1a at a very early. perl1ap~ prc1nature. stage indeed. The 
result of Reeves· success was. and sti II is. a rneta II ic rigidity in the evolution of the coro] Ia rics 
identified above. ln p~1rticular. the legislative fornHdae for identification of the parties and 
proper subjects for bargaining has evolved fron1 being a mere supportive exoskeleton to being 
a stilT statutory straitjacket. For exarnple. it is fair to say that rather than workers forn1ing ·or 
choosing a CBA. a pre-existing statutory-ordained CBA chooses thc1n. 
In a process vividly described in the Green Paper as a ··gold rush .. (vol. 2. p. 21 ). the first 
CBA up the steps to the Registrar's office received a perpetual indefeasible title to the staked-
out block ofindustrial topography. The benefits of this perpetual title are well described in the 
Green Paper (vo] J. pp. 6-7). 
It is suggested. therefore. that the real heart of the Green Paper. and the greatest potential 
for unlocking the legislative straitjacket of Reeves· syste1n.lies in question 6 ofvolu1ne 1. and 
chapters l. I D and 1.2C of volu n1c 2. 
Question 6 should not he phrased .. \Vhich approach is the n1ost appropriate for 
dctern1ining compulsory union tnernber::;hip?" but rather .. What is the best n1ethod of 
identifying pclrtics to the collective bargaining process? .. and .. Should the workers· CBA be 
based on historical priority or workers· choice? .. If the latter. then a systen1 of Department of 
Labour supervised work place competitive ballots should be considered. Political solicitude 
for the existing union structure is presurnably responsible for the unspoken assun1ptions of 
the Green Paper. but if the Minister wishes to prepare an industrial ornelette for the next 
century. he must risk cracking a few union eggs fron1 the last century. 
